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Abstract. Building upon trans-disciplinary insights from the ‘socio-economics 
of labour markets’ tradition and drawing upon critical realist meta-theory, this 
paper outlines a trans-disciplinary (proto1) model of labour markets as an 
alternative to the orthodox model. 
 
Introduction 
There are, essentially, two conceptualisations of labour markets: the well 
known neoclassical, mainstream or orthodox approach, and what I call the 
‘socio-economic’ approach. The former results in the orthodox model of labour 
markets; the latter approach does not have this level of coherence and so 
does not constitute a model. In this introduction I sketch the basics of both the 
orthodox model and the socio-economic approach, noting the shortcomings of 
each.2 These shortcomings motivate the argument that an alternative to the 
orthodox model is necessary, and that the raw material out of which such an 
alternative can be fashioned can be drawn from trans-disciplinary insights 
available within the socio-economic approach – when, that is, it is rooted in 
critical realist meta-theory. 
  
Orthodox model of labour markets 
The orthodox model of labour markets is rooted firmly in the idea that, at the 
heart of labour markets there exist functional relations between wage rates 
and the supply and demand for labour, that is, supply and demand curves for 
labour. It is only on the conceptualisation of well behaved, and correctly 
signed, supply and demand functions (or curves) that it makes sense to claim 
that as the wage rate increases, demand for labour falls and supply of labour 
increases. It is only on this conceptualisation that it makes sense to claim that 
if we could only succeed in removing ‘impediments’ or ‘frictions’ (a.k.a. 
institutions) that distort the operation of supply and demand functions, we 
could make labour markets more flexible and more efficient. As Blank and 
Freeman (1994: 30) put matters:  
 
The argument that social protection harms economic outcomes is 
familiar to economists because it is derived from first principles 
about the effect of interventions in perfectly functioning markets. 
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Most institutional interventions create incentives for market 
participants to behave differently than they otherwise would, 
implying some distortionary loss of social welfare from the 
competitive ideal. 
 
This model has, of course, been augmented over the 80 years since Hicks 
(1932) first penned it in a coherent manner. Indeed, it has recently become 
commonplace for orthodox labour economists to recognise the existence of 
what they generically, but ambiguously, refer to as ‘institutions’, and to 
recognise that these ‘institutions’ influence the operation of labour markets. 
Hence we find, within the orthodox literature, discussion of phenomena like: 
trade unions, families, gender, race, efficiency wages, principle-agent 
distinctions, insider-outsider distinctions and so on. It is considerations like 
this that prompted no less a figure than Solow (1990) to write a short book 
entitled The Labour Market as a Social Institution; and more recently St Paul 
(2000) to write a book entitled The Political Economy of Labour Market 
Institutions. Many (but by no means all) contemporary orthodox labour 
economist’s text books mention institutions, and some even devote chapters 
to these phenomena (e.g. Bosworth, Dawkins and Stromback 1996).  
 
Recognising the fact that institutions exist and influence the operation of 
labour markets does not, however, mean that orthodox labour economists are 
able to analyse them, and analyse them adequately. Indeed, a strong case 
can be made that the analysis of ‘institutions’ offered by orthodox labour 
economists is extremely inadequate. Several factors combine to make this so, 
the most important are listed below. 
 
First, orthodox labour economics claims to have made advances relative to 
Institutionalist labour economics in recent decades because the former has 
become a ‘science’ (Fleisher 1971: 1). Whilst the meta-theoretical approach is 
nowhere explicitly stated, it appears to involve some kind of positivist 
philosophy of science, Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method and a 
preoccupation with quantification, mathematics and statistics.3 This approach 
has allowed orthodox labour economics to throw off its previous ‘Cinderella 
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status’ and progress by: displaying greater ‘theoretical rigour’; becoming more 
‘analytical’; more ‘quantitative’; and started to use ‘advanced econometric 
techniques’. Fallon and Very, articulate the point well: 
 
Firstly, what used to be a largely descriptive and institutional 
subject, often virtually synonymous with industrial relations, has 
become more analytical. Secondly, the subject has become more 
quantitative. Some very advanced econometric techniques are 
now commonly used in labour economics research (Fallon and 
Very 1988; ix). 
 
Almost two decades later, McConnell, Brue and Macpherson repeat the 
sentiment: 
 
Economists have achieved important analytical breakthroughs in 
studying labor markets and labor problems. As a result, economic 
analysis has crowded out historical, institutional, legal, and 
anecdotal material. Labor economics increasingly became applied 
micro and macro theory (McConnell, Brue and Macpherson 2006: 3, 
emphasis added).  
 
Rather than see these meta-theoretical commitments as an advance, 
however, many critics see them as a serious handicap. Because many 
institutions or aspects of institutions are non-quantifiable, they cannot be dealt 
with adequately with this ‘scientific’ approach and are often quietly ignored.  
 
Furthermore, orthodox labour economics faces an irresolvable contradiction. 
To be plausible, a model of labour markets must either explain the complete 
range of labour market phenomena within its disciplinary borders; or it must 
be able to transcend these borders, to collaborate with other social scientists 
and properly embrace some of their concepts: unfortunately it can do neither. 
The mono-disciplinarity of orthodox labour economics cannot be overcome by 
a trans-disciplinary manoeuvre whilst remaining faithful to the ‘scientific’ 
approach because it would undermine the very (‘scientific’) basis upon which 
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orthodox economics alleges to have made significant advances. In any case, 
orthodox economists cannot collaborate with other social scientists because 
many (perhaps most) of the latter abandoned homo economicus, rational 
choice and individualism, decades ago, and for whom positivism, the H-D 
method and the preoccupation with quantification, mathematics and statistics 
is a bogus kind of science - better described as ‘scientism’. 
 
Second, according to one orthodox economist: ‘Currently, labour economics 
consists of the competitive model with bits bolted onto it to explain away 
anomalies. The result is often not a pretty sight’ (Manning 2003: 11, emphasis 
added)4. And some of the ‘bits’ that eventually get ‘bolted on’ are ‘institutions’. 
Because the orthodox model of labour markets has no real place for these 
‘institutions’, the term ‘institutions’ ends up being used as a kind of dustbin 
category in which to place a variety of phenomena that are in a sense 
recognised (how could they not be) but not elaborated upon – although see 
caveats in the third and fourth points below. If we unpack this term, however, 
we see it refers to a wide range of phenomena that are social and cultural 
(including rules, social and cultural structures, conventions, norm, values, 
rules and regulations); economic (understood as far more than the behaviour 
of maximising individuals competing for scarce resources); organisational 
(including organisations themselves, and the roles and customs); political and 
ideological (including power, class, gender, race etc); and social-psychological 
(including notions of habit or habitus). For ease of exposition I will refer to 
these as social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes.5 Orthodox labour 
economic theory is ill-equipped to deal with phenomena like these. Where, for 
example, does one bring power, political ideology or (relatively unconscious) 
habit into the orthodox model?  
 
Furthermore, the possibility that institutions might actually dominate, or even 
completely negate, the ‘economic’ forces of wages, supply and demand, so 
that the analysis of labour markets becomes the analysis of these institutions, 
is never seriously entertained.  As Hyclak, Johnes and Thornton, (2004: 19) 
put matters: ‘Adjustment to a demand and supply equilibrium may be 
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complicated by institutional factors, but we would nevertheless expect supply 
and demand to be major influences on labour market outcomes.’6 This is, 
however, more of an article of faith than an article of analysis. Orthodox 
economists simply hope that this is the case: if institutions, rather than supply 
and demand, are the major influences on labour market outcomes, then the 
orthodox model of labour markets is just about as wrong as it is possible to 
be. 
 
Third, where attempts are made to analyse ‘institutions’, they are often 
conceptualised in such a way that they can be analysed ‘scientifically’, for 
example by conceptualising them in terms of a rational agent maximising 
some (quantifiable) return under a constraint, within a perfect or imperfectly 
competitive environment. According to Elliott (1991: xvii) ‘the neoclassical 
paradigm’ is ‘grounded in a view of rational maximising behaviour on the part 
of the individual, a group of individuals or a firm [that] provides a logical 
framework with which to interpret and to predict behaviour in labor markets’. A 
good example of this is the orthodox analysis of the ‘institution’, a trade union. 
Rather than understanding trade unions as complex social, economic, 
cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, they are 
reduced, typically, to rational agents maximising membership or some other 
relatively naïve objective. The cost of analysing ‘institutions’ ‘scientifically’, 
however, is to empty the institution of many of its most important (and 
explanatory) features.7
 
Fourth, where attempts are made to incorporate ‘institutions’ in the model, the 
analysis is not aimed at probing into the nature of ‘institutions’, and explaining 
exactly what they are and exactly how they operate, but is aimed at 
measuring their effect on things like wages, employment levels and speed of 
adjustment. Fallon and Very (1988) are up-front about this: 
 
We do not believe that labour economics can be studied in a 
historical or institutional vacuum. Nevertheless pure description is 
rarely enlightening. The best of current research in labour 
economics...does not ignore institutions, customs or convention but 
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attempts to analyse what constraints they impose on more 
traditional  economic motivations such as cost minimisation, profit 
maximisation and utility maximisation...[E]ach of these subjects is 
now treated much more rigorously ( Fallon and Very 1988; ix). 
 
Nowhere is this focus on measuring the effect of ‘institutions’ on things like 
wages, employment levels and speed of adjustment more apparent than in 
the ‘institutions versus market forces’ literature.8 A good example of this is a 
recent book by Carneiro, Gill and Paes de Barros (2006) illuminatingly called 
The Third Dimension of Labour Markets: Demand, Supply and Institutions in 
Brazil. In the introduction they refer to the: 
 
three sides of the labour market: labor demand, labor supply and 
the institutional framework…[W]e consider labor market institutions, 
including regulations and interventions as the main  source of 
concern in the search for a well functioning labour market (3). 
 
[T]his book introduces novel aspects in the analysis by bringing into 
play the ‘third side’ of the labour market (institutions) along with 
labor demand and supply (8).  
 
Apart from not defining the term ‘institution’ the book fails to really examine 
‘the third side’, that is, ‘institutions’ in their own right. Institutions are 
considered, primarily, because they influence labour market outcomes in 
terms of wages, labour supplied and labour demanded. In a paper entitled 
‘Labour Market Institutions and Performance’ and a section entitled ‘Labour 
Market Institutions’, Nickell and Layard reveal what is, arguably, the typical 
way of dealing with institutions:  
 
It is difficult to define precisely what we mean by labour market 
institutions, so we simply provide a list of these features of the 
labour market which we shall consider. The boundaries of the list 
are somewhat arbitrary (1999: 3037).  
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If truth be told, they are not very interested in probing deeply into the nature of 
these institutions, and finding out how they do what they do; they are far more 
interested in measuring the impact of their chosen ‘institutions’, namely: ‘the 
level of labour taxation; the system of employment protection; trade union 
activity and minimum wages; income support for the unemployed and active 
labour market policy; and education and skill formation’ (1999: 3031). It would 
be nice to know exactly what institutions are, how they operate, how agents 
interact with them and so on, before rushing out and measuring them.  
 
Fifth, orthodoxy’s commitment to ontological, epistemological and 
methodological individualism (Hodgson 2006a) means that institutions must 
(on pain of contradiction) be conceived of, reductively, as the mere outcome 
of individuals enacting their preferences. The idea that there is an ontological 
distinction between institutions and the individuals that reproduce or transform 
them; or that institutions influence the preferences and actions of these 
individuals, ideas that are virtually unanimously agreed upon in sociological 
theory, cannot be sustained. The same goes for all those versions of New 
Institutionalism prevalent within the economics literature, taking their lead from 
transaction cost economics introduced by Coase, or satisficing behaviour 
introduced by Williamson.9 In labour economics, this approach is typified by 
Marsden (1999).  
 
Sixth, many orthodox labour economists, occasionally feel the need to refer to 
reality and realisticness.10 Manning (2003: 5), for example, reminds us that we 
should ‘choose an assumption that is a reasonable approximation of reality’. 
Unfortunately, even Manning lapses into unrealisticness whenever 
mathematical tractability dictates, and he makes use of theories like marginal 
productivity which are extremely unrealistic. Relaxing a few assumptions from 
the perfectly competitive model, whilst keeping the rest of the theory intact, 
and remaining committed to positivism, the H-D method, quantification, 
mathematics and statistics, is most unlikely to deliver anything but unrealistic 
models. This is because the majority of assumptions underpinning the 
orthodox model of labour markets are not used on the grounds that 
economists have actually studied real human beings engaging with real 
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institutions and concluded from detailed anthropological, empirical 
investigations, that they are a ‘good enough’ approximation to reality. These 
assumptions are made for the sole purpose of formal or mathematical 
tractability. Leaving institutions out of the model or treating them as no more 
than phenomena that impact upon labour market outcomes leads to 
unrealistic models.  
  
Socio-economic approach to labour markets 
It is possible to identify a body of knowledge that I call the ‘socio-economics of 
labour markets’.11 It consists in the work of heterodox economists such as 
economic-sociologists, evolutionary economists, feminists, (Old) 
Institutionalists, Marxists, post-Keynesians, regulationists, and segmented 
labour market theorists, as well as those who would not describe themselves 
as ‘economists’, yet who write on labour markets, coming from disciplines like: 
industrial or employment relations, labour law, human resource management, 
education research, organisational and management theory, sociology of work 
and employment, state theory, urban geography and so on. Within this body 
of knowledge can be found, valuable, trans-disciplinary insights (i.e. ideas, 
concepts, theories, observations, empirical data and so on) about the nature 
of labour markets. By this I mean insights into the way labour markets are 
produced (i.e. made), reproduced or transformed the way they are, as 
opposed to some other way. It is important to note that the production, 
reproduction and transformation of labour markets is not an act of God or 
some other miracle: it is an entirely anthropic affair. Labour markets only exist 
because different sets of agents interact with different sets of social, 
economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, 
in different spatio-temporal locations. If human agents produce, reproduce 
and transform labour markets in particular ways, then it leaves open the 
possibility that they could produce, reproduce and transform them in different 
ways if  they so choose.  
 
Many socio-economists of labour markets reject (all or large parts of) the 
orthodox model of labour markets. There are various reasons for this, some 
noted above, but the following is a crucial one. The orthodox model at best 
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ignores, and at worst has a superficial analysis of, the social, economic, 
cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions 
and processes through which labour markets are produced, produced the way 
they are, and reproduced or transformed. It is precisely these phenomena that 
are central to socio-economic analysis of labour markets.  
 
Whilst there are many valuable, trans-disciplinary, socio-economic insights 
currently available into the nature of labour markets, there is a shortcoming: 
they exist in a rather partial and fragmented manner. Whilst these insights are 
the raw material out of which an alternative trans-disciplinary model might be 
fashioned, more work needs to be done to actually synthesise them to form 
such a model. And here is where meta-theory comes in again. If partial and 
fragmented insights existing at the ‘theoretical’ and/or ‘empirical’ levels are to 
be synthesised, then it makes sense to seek the synthesis at, metaphorically 
speaking, the ‘deeper’ level of the meta-theoretical. Critical realism lends itself 
to this task whilst allowing us to avoid the problems associated with the 
(quasi) positivist philosophy of science, (quasi) H-D method, and the 
preoccupation with quantification, mathematics and inferential statistics 
underpinning the orthodox model. Many socio-economists are starting to 
accept critical realism as a plausible meta-theoretical foundation.  
 
Taking stock 
Socio-economists criticize the orthodox model of labour economics because it 
is bedevilled by serious shortcomings, samples of which are noted above. 
When orthodox economists do respond to criticism of this kind (and such 
responses are nowadays rare) they have an extremely strong trump card to 
play. Their response, typically, is: ‘well at least we have a model and not just a 
set of descriptions’. Robert Elliott, author of a textbook on labour economics, 
and one who is aware of some of these shortcomings puts the point well:    
 
Throughout this text, and despite the urgings of some of those who 
read the text, the neoclassical paradigm represents the maintained 
hypothesis….Until an alternative and superior analytical framework 
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is provided, I am reluctant to abandon the one we have (Elliott 
1991: xvii).  
 
Socio-economists find this difficult to respond to for two reasons. First, 
because, valuable as their trans-disciplinary insights are, they are partial, 
fragmented and do not add up to anything resembling a ‘superior analytical 
framework’. There is no alternative, trans-disciplinary model so the orthodox 
model ‘wins’ by default.  Second, whilst many socio-economists have 
abandoned the positivist philosophy of science, Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) 
method and a preoccupation with quantification, mathematics and statistics, 
they appear unsure what meta-theoretical apparatus to replace it with. This 
compounds the first difficulty of not having a model of some kind.  How, then, 
should socio-economists proceed? My suggestion is this: we take the valuable 
trans-disciplinary insights from the socio-economics of labour markets as the 
raw material for an alternative model, and couple this with critical realist meta-
theory, enabling us to synthesise these insights into a coherent whole. And 
this is precisely the objective of this paper. The objective is to sketch, in fairly 
rough outline, the beginnings of an alternative, trans-disciplinary (proto) model 
of labour markets. I make no apologies for the speculative nature of the paper. 
The kind of paradigm shift we can, and I believe should, be making is most 
unlikely to occur without some initial speculation: unless someone starts 
somewhere, an alternative will never materialise. Paraphrasing Elliott, we 
might say that: ‘until an alternative and superior analytical framework is 
provided (even if it is initially speculative) economists will be reluctant to 
abandon the one they have’. 
 
The paper proceeds in three parts. Part one identifies the insights currently 
available via the socio-economic tradition; part two turns to meta-theory and 
briefly rehearses critical realism; and part three builds up the alternative model 
in five stages to eventually provide a trans-disciplinary (proto) model of labour 
markets.  
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1. Existing socio-economists insights 
Socio-economists appear committed to the general idea that, whatever labour 
markets are, they cannot operate without institutions and/or social structures. 
This is expressed variously, by referring to the institutionalised nature of 
labour markets, or to labour markets being embedded in institutions - and/or 
social structures, a term absent from orthodox economics, but central to much 
social theory. Whilst this is an advance over orthodox labour economics, we 
need to go much farther than this, because the idea of ‘embedding’ is not 
unproblematic. It presupposes the existence of two phenomena; one called 
‘labour markets’, and the other called ‘institutions and social structures’ (i.e. 
social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological 
phenomena) with the former embedded in the latter. It presupposes a 
separate place or space, nested within the realms of the social, economic, 
cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological, where something called 
‘labour markets’ exist. What is wrong with this conception becomes clear the 
moment one asks: Where are these labour markets? Setting the question up 
in this way leaves us searching for a place or space where something like a 
‘pure’ labour market, characterised perhaps by supply and demand functions, 
operates. When matters are put like this, and they rarely are, it becomes clear 
that no such place or space exists. Instead of conceiving of labour markets as 
embedded in economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological 
phenomena, I offer a more radical conception. For me, labour markets just 
are, or are exhausted by, the social, economic, cultural, political, ideological 
and social-psychological phenomena, that constitute them.12  
 
I might be the first to make this claim with such a degree of boldness and 
precision, but the insights I draw upon are not new, and many post-war 
Institutional economists would probably wonder what the fuss is all about! 
Consider some examples.  
 
Markets are co-extensive, or wholly contained within, institutions. 
More precisely, markets are clusters of working rules that guide 
conduct in transactions….Yngve Ramstad explained that ‘the price 
mechanism’ is mentally inseparable from the instituted working 
rules of which it is but an active description. Indeed, without an 
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understanding of the specific rules themselves, one cannot 
understand how the mechanism functions (Brown, 2005: 922).  
 
[L]abor markets are not things unto themselves; their attributes, 
their properties, are to a significant degree what employers [i.e. 
organisations] make them out to be (Berg and Kallenberg 2001: 
12).  
 
The role of firm’s employment policies in structuring the external 
labour market has been largely unexplored…In practice, the 
external labour market takes its form through the influence of a 
whole range of institutions including the family, the state and 
employing organizations (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994: 14).13
 
The reason no-one has yet managed to complete the task of synthesising 
these partial and fragmented, trans-disciplinary insights into a coherent whole, 
apart from the enormity of the task, is meta-theoretical.14 The task requires a 
meta-theory suited to the task. It is to this we now turn.  
 
2. Meta-theory 
The meta-theory underpinning the proto model I sketch below is critical 
realism.15  There is now a fairly extensive literature on critical realism in 
economics, so I will restrict my comments to the following cursory remarks. 
Critical realists advocate a causal-explanatory method. Whilst in open 
systems, prediction (based on induction) is not possible, explanation is, and 
so explanation replaces prediction as the objective of social science. To 
explain, is to provide a causal account, one that provides information about (a) 
the causal mechanisms at work, and (b) the agents who engage with these 
causal mechanisms.16
 
For critical realism, a theory is (minimally)17 a set of statements designed, not 
to sustain a prediction or hypothesis, but to sustain a causal explanatory 
account. Whilst the statements that constitute a theory should be empirically 
testable, in open systems, testing theories via the usual statistical tests of their 
predictions is not possible. But in open systems, explanations can be 
evaluated to ascertain which theories are more explanatorily powerful than 
others. True, this is not a straightforward matter, and more work needs to be 
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done to elaborate what is involved in deciding what constitutes explanatory 
power. But the simple fact is, with prediction ruled out, there really is nothing 
else: we have to proceed with explanation at the objective, and explanatory 
power as the criterion for evaluating theories.  
 
For critical realism, a model is a set of theories consistently and coherently 
arranged to express or reflect the reality which it purports to model. A model is 
not a description of reality, because it abstracts from key features of reality. 
But this does not license the kinds of flights of fancy common in orthodox 
models. A model cannot contain known falsehoods or fictions, as this would 
immediately negate the requirement that a model should express or reflect 
reality. A model, then, must be realistic.  
 
For critical realism, there is no reason why a theory has to be mathematical 
and hence no reason why a model has to be mathematical. A non-
mathematical model of labour markets is totally acceptable. It consists of 
theories (i.e. statements designed to sustain a causal explanatory account) of 
the main social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena that constitute the labour market. This must include 
an account of labour market agents and how they engage with these 
phenomena. Hence, for critical realism, a model is based upon an agency – 
structure conception.  
 
The (proto) model sketched in part three is based upon a method of 
successive approximation involving five steps. Each step starts with a 
diagram, followed by a narrative, showing in rough chronological terms the 
main stages involved in the operation of labour markets. Step one is a ‘first 
cut’, introducing the stages undertaken by a typical supplier of labour services. 
Step two is another ‘first cut’, this time introducing the stages undertaken by a 
typical demander of labour services. Step three returns to the typical supplier 
of labour services and takes a ‘second cut’, adding more complexity. Step four 
returns to the typical demander of labour services and also takes a ‘second 
cut’. The final step brings all this together.  
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The method of successive approximation is based on the idea of building 
complexity into the analysis step by step so that the final step (five) 
approximates reality more fully than the first; and the final step is less abstract 
than the first. Note, however, that whilst many orthodox economists claim to 
do something similar, their steps almost always involve not abstraction, but 
fiction. They start with assumptions that are known to be fictions (or 
falsehoods) and are used only because they are mathematically tractable. 
Some, but by no means all, of these assumptions are gradually relaxed – 
although in many cases, others are added to shore the model up as 
complexity is added (Fleetwood 2001a, see also 1999a; 1999b; 2001b). The 
proto model sketched below contains nothing that is known to be fictitious or 
false – although, being fallible, I may have made a mistake, but this is an 
entirely different matter.  
 
The following outline is carried out at a high level of abstraction. Stones’ 
(1996) metaphor of floating over the landscape in a balloon is useful here. In a 
balloon, we see all the main components that constitute the landscape, but 
not in any detail. In our case, we see the main components that constitute 
labour markets, but not in any detail. This abstract sketch of the most 
important social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes, often means giving scant 
mention of important things (e.g. unions, employment law, migration, self-
employment, health, housing and transport) and abstracting from others 
completely (e.g. place and space, macro-economic factors, macro and micro-
economic policy and globalisation). This cannot be avoided. But if the outline 
is initially plausible, then it can gradually be elaborated upon.  
 
Finally, whilst I have laid out the various stages in a ‘rough chronology’ there 
is an important caveat: causality is complex and recursive. It is (spatially) 
complex in the sense that causal factors affecting the ‘supply side’ are often 
rooted in the ‘demand side’ (and vice versa). It is (chronologically) complex in 
the sense that causal factors affecting the chronology are not always linear. 
The actions of firms can, for example, have an impact on the way individuals 
will think and act in labour markets, even before they are born, socialised or 
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educated. Causality is recursive in the sense that feed-back loops exist. The 
labour market is not, for example, the direct or proximate cause of the division 
of gender or race in the sense that membership of these categories pre-dates 
activity in the labour market. But activity in the labour market, typically, 
reinforces men’s and white’s relative advantages over women and blacks and 
so can be considered an indirect or distal cause of this categorical division.  
 
Now that we have some idea of the meta-theory that might allow us to 
synthesise the valuable, trans-disciplinary insights, let us move to the next 
section and start the process of building the proto model.  
 
3.1 Step 1: The stages undertaken by a typical supplier of labour 
services: first cut 
Perhaps the best way to understand this section is to imagine the following 
(roughly chronological) stages. Imagine a family; that family having a child; 
that child being brought up so that s/he is prepared (mentally and physically) 
for his or her eventual involvement in labour markets and world of work; 
informed about the available jobs and how to join the labour queue and 
possibly gain employment. For any individual to successfully negotiate these 
stages (i.e. from being born to being recruited and beyond) and, thereby, to 
successfully supply their labour services, s/he must engage in, and with, a 
range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes. Let us consider some of 
the more fundamental ones.  
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Division of the labour force 
The (potential) working population is heterogeneous. Before any exposure to 
labour markets, it is divided by class, gender, race, (dis)ability, family type, 
space and place, health (physical and mental), housing status, longevity, 
nationality, political persuasion, religion, sexual orientation, national residency 
status (relating to various categories of migrant labour) and, as part of the 
gender division, various forms of caring responsibilities (primarily children and 
elderly relatives) not to mention things like hairstyle, (good) looks, body 
shape, size and weight, the presence of body piercings and tattoos, and the 
use of alcohol, cigarettes and recreational drugs. All potential labour market 
participants are located in one, or several, of these categories. This is a far cry 
from homo economicus, the agent at the centre of orthodox economics, who 
is located in none of these categories – although feminist economists have 
pointed out that the underlying presupposition is that homo economicus is 
male.  
 
The following six points might help to clarify issues relating to this 
heterogeneity. First, in order to avoid having to run through this (above) list 
every time a reference to heterogeneity in general is required, I will simply 
refer to the working population being ‘divided into several categories’, or the 
‘categorical division of the working population’ or some variant. Second, the 
criterion for inclusion in the list is that being located in one, or several, of these 
categories is likely to have an impact upon the way participants think and act 
in relation to labour markets. Third, the list is open to contestation: some 
things I have excluded might, arguably, be added; and some things I have 
included might, arguably, be dropped. But the categories I have chosen are 
neither arbitrary nor infinite. Fourth, being located in one, or several, of these 
categories says nothing about the strength of the impact membership has on 
labour market participation. If gender has a stronger impact upon a person’s 
labour market participation and/or activity than, say, smoking, this does not 
alter the fact that both gender and smoking might have an impact. Deciding 
what matters and how much, is an empirical issue. Fifth, is the objection that 
this or that category is a ‘special case’, and it can be left out of the analysis so 
that a more encompassing, general approach can be taken. A glance at the 
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list shows that many of these categories are far from minority, special cases. 
And even those that are, must be open to analysis within any plausible model. 
Finally, people may be located in one, or several, of these categories; they 
may also be able to move in and out of some of them. But there is no avoiding 
being located in one, or several of them.  
 
The second point is crucial. Things like whether a person enters the labour 
market or not, whereabouts in the labour queue they are ranked, which 
segment of the labour market they enter, which industry, occupation or even 
firm they end up working in, the wages, fringe benefits, pensions they earn, 
and health benefits (if any) they are offered, the employment conditions, the 
degree of self-expression, creativity, self actualisation, autonomy, 
empowerment they experience, or perhaps the degree of alienation, 
commodification, precariousness, vulnerability and insecurity they experience, 
will almost certainly be influenced by their membership of one or several of 
these categories. Note well, however, that this influence occurs because 
membership of one or several of these categories exposes the member to a 
range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes, and it is these things, not 
simply membership of the category itself, that is causal.  
 
Producing, reproducing, preparing and informing the labour force 
A workforce does not emerge out of thin air: it is produced in two senses. 
First, the ‘raw material’ (i.e. a human population) is produced, and 
reproduced, in some form of family unit. Second, a workforce is not 
necessarily a prepared workforce, that is, one that is educated and skilled, in 
both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ skills, active in the sense of actively job-seeking, and 
motivated in the sense of being ready and willing to work with a degree of 
commitment once on the job. And a prepared workforce is not necessarily an 
informed workforce. An informed workforce is one that knows about the 
quality and quantity of available jobs, and knows how to enter the labour 
queue. There are, of course, degrees of activity, motivation and information. 
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Information comes from a variety of sources, a crucial one being recruitment 
networks.  
 
To the extent that such a thing exists, how does a prepared (i.e. educated, 
skilled, active and motivated) and informed workforce come into being? Some 
of the causal impulses come from within the individual labour market agents in 
the form of their own needs and preferences, although even here, we should 
be cognisant of things like the alienating nature of many kinds of work, which 
are not always simply a matter of subjective preferences. Other impulses 
come from outside the individual, primarily, from three sets of interconnected 
organisations: the family; the firm and the state (local, national and supra-
national); and secondarily from social structures and organisations in which 
these organisations are located. I will elaborate on these in step three below.  
 
Joining the labour queue and recruitment 
The penultimate stage occurs when a potential labour market participant 
enters the labour queue. The participant waits, as it were, in line, for an 
employer to register the possibility of recruitment – at the next stage. Here, 
membership of one, or several, of the above categories has causal 
implications for whereabouts in the labour queue the participant is ranked. 
Potential employers are not neutral vis-à-vis the type of workers they prefer to 
hire, and in many cases this results in certain categories of workers being 
overlooked in the queue. The final stage occurs when a labour market 
participant is recruited from the job queue. At this point pay and conditions 
(widely conceived) are eventually agreed upon, although there are, typically, 
many mechanisms through which this can occur. I will say more about this 
under step three below.  
 
Let me sum up stage one. For any individual to successfully negotiate the 
various stages just sketched and, thereby, to successfully supply their labour 
services, s/he must engage in, and with, a range of social, economic, cultural, 
political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions and 
processes.  
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3.2. Step 2: The stages undertaken by a typical demander of labour 
services: first cut 
Perhaps the best way to understand this section is to imagine the following: a 
firm; that firm operating in the short run by deciding upon crewing levels, on-
the job training, and managing technical and labour processes - long run 
activity will be considered in step four. For any individual firm to successfully 
negotiate the various stages just sketched and, thereby, to successfully recruit 
those who seek to  supply their labour services, it must engage in, and with, a 
range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes. Let us consider some of 
the more fundamental ones. 
 
Division of firms 
The set of firms that demand labour is heterogeneous. Firms are divided by 
size, corporate structure, nature of production (process, manufacturing, 
extractive, service), nature of the technology employed, stage of maturity, 
whether it is private or public, and so on. These factors often play a key role in 
the way firms subsequently carry out the activities that constitute the very 
labour market that they are presumed to operate within, This will become a 
little clearer in step four. 
 
Short run: technology, labour and management processes 
By the ‘short run’ I mean an actual period of historical time, not the orthodox 
economic concept of the short run, a fictionalised ‘time’ where nothing 
happens. The point of introducing it is simply to illustrate that during the short 
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run, the firm will be operating with technological, labour and management 
processes that have a degree of fixity to them. This does not mean they are 
fixed (as marginal productivity theory suggests); it does mean that the exact 
degree of fixity is an empirical matter. At any point in time, for example, a firm 
will be operating with a workforce that was, largely, educated (at school, 
college or university) in a past time period; either came to the firm with certain 
skills, or is in the process of augmenting these skills on the job via some kind 
of training. It will also be operating with a set of jobs, flexible working 
arrangements, and employment contracts the qualitative nature of which 
cannot be altered significantly without re-designing the technological, labour 
and management processes. 
 
It is in the short run, that the firm makes decisions about crewing levels. One 
thing is clear: the idea that crewing levels, and hence the firms demand for 
labour, is determined by firms substituting infinitesimal amounts of (putty-like) 
labour and capital in responses to changes in the price of these two inputs is a 
complete fiction. Real production systems are, of course, nothing like this. 
This does not mean relative factor price has no influence, simply that other 
influences are likely to be more causally efficacious. Decisions about how to 
integrate workers with machinery are multi-causal and multi-dimensional, and 
take into account a range of causal factors that I have referred to generally, as 
having a technological, labour and management nature. So, whilst an extra 
pilot cannot be substituted for an aircraft wing, neither can a robot be 
substituted for a nurse with a ‘good bedside manner’. Even where factor 
substitution is technologically possible, crewing levels are, typically, the 
subject of extensive bargaining which may or may not involve unions or other 
unofficial workplace representatives; always involves management; and 
always involves issues of power. Crewing levels, and hence the basis of the 
demand for labour, is better understood as being ‘administrated’. 
 
Preparation, information and recruitment 
In the short run, firms are not involved in preparation in the sense noted above 
– this will become clearer below. An informed firm is one that knows about 
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available labour supply and knows how to get it from the labour queue. Firms 
play a role in establishing the supply networks (although perhaps not, or not 
entirely, the recruitment networks) through which they recruit labour services. 
The final stage occurs when a labour market participant is recruited from the 
job queue. I will elaborate on this in the next step.   
 
Let me sum up step two. For any individual firm to successfully negotiate the 
various (short run) stages just sketched and, thereby, to successfully recruit 
those who seek to  supply their labour services, it must engage in, and with, a 
range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes.  
 
3.3 Step 3: The stages undertaken by a typical supplier of labour 
services: second cut 
This section returns to the typical supplier of labour, but in this ‘second cut’, 
more complexity is added, and the model becomes more realistic, by 
introducing those of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-
psychological phenomena, actions and processes that were abstracted from 
in step one. 
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Production and reproduction of the workforce 
To the extent that such a thing exists, a prepared (i.e. educated, skilled, active 
and motivated) and informed workforce comes into being, in part, from 
impulses arising from outside the individual, primarily from three sets of 
interconnected organisations: the family; business organisations and the state 
(local, national and supra-national) and secondarily from social structures and 
organisations in which these organisations are located. I will discuss family 
and state here, discuss the state again in the next step, and discuss the firm 
exclusively in step four. 
 
The family  
It is well known that labour power is a quasi-commodity, in part because it is 
not produced and reproduced via the market: there are no farms producing 
and selling children – or at least not yet! Indeed, labour power is produced 
and reproduced in the family. Whilst Marxists and feminists once crossed 
swords in the ‘domestic labour debate’18 this debate has quietly been 
forgotten. Yet many of the issues that were debated are extremely important 
today, and many have now been accepted by non-Marxists and non-feminists. 
Let me briefly sketch why domestic labour matters for labour market analysis. 
Whilst this sketch is at a very high level of abstraction, and is not intended to 
express any particular conception of the family (and other institutions) it does 
presuppose something like an under-elaborated male-breadwinner model.  
  
In order for society to be reproduced, two kinds of work are necessary: that 
which is paid, and that which is unpaid. Much of the latter falls in the category 
of ‘domestic labour’, primarily involving a set of tasks such as caring for 
children, elderly people and disabled people, and running the household. 
Caring for children includes biological and also socio-psychological caring as 
one of the main sites of primary socialisation is the family. For good or evil, 
the main responsibility for caring has passed onto the shoulders of women. 
Those who perform all (or most of) the domestic labour, typically have no (or a 
relatively small) income from paid work; those who perform no (or a relatively 
small part of) domestic labour, typically have an income from paid work; those 
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who ‘share’ (which does not necessarily imply the ‘share’ is equal) domestic 
labour with a partner, typically, have an income from part-time work and share 
the income of their partner. This division of labour is a socio-economic 
arrangement that allows the family to reproduce itself, but it has two 
consequences that are almost impossible to overstate. First, the family 
produces a steady supply of (duly socialised) potential workers at absolutely 
no cost to the firms who will eventually hire them. This is the only input into 
production (apart perhaps for air) that the firm gets for nothing. It is not free of 
course, it costs those who perform domestic labour their labour time. Second, 
the responsibility for performing domestic labour casts a long shadow over 
women’s participation in the labour market and work, and is largely 
responsible for various forms of discrimination. Firms (and the state) clearly 
have a powerful interest in maintaining the family in something like its current 
form.  As long as women are providing domestic labour free of charge, firms 
and the state can avoid the additional cost that might be incurred if they had to 
provide these services themselves.  
 
Preparation and the family 
The family also plays a role in the stage of preparation via the process of 
socialisation, or the process of establishing the habitus or habits.  For the 
context of labour market analysis, this is important because a workforce is not 
just a mass of workers waiting in the labour queue, it is a mass of workers 
who have acquired an appropriate set of habits. These might, for example, be 
the habits involved with getting out of bed in the morning and turning up, on 
time, at school, and later at work. Or they might, for example, be the habits 
involved with expectations of ‘fairness’, something that might even dispose the 
person towards (or against) trade union membership later in life. Clearly, 
whilst the family does inculcate habits that are not explicitly sought by 
employers, the family almost certainly inculcates some that are so sought.  
 
Moreover, the categorical differences noted earlier also have a role to play 
here. Working class families might instil in their children the habits associated 
with deferring to their ‘elders and betters’; whilst ruling class families might 
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instil in their children the habits associated with being the ‘betters’. Working 
class families might instil in their children the habits associated with working 
hard at school, and choosing courses that allow them to ‘get a good job’; 
whilst middle class families might instil in their children the habits associated 
with ‘education for education sake’. The family is also an organisation where 
boys and girls learn their gendered roles. Little boys learn that, in the future, 
they might think about being a welder, but not a beautician; whereas little girls 
learn that, in the future, they might think about being a beautician, but not a 
welder. I could go on here to discuss our attitudes to race, sexual orientation, 
disability, age, migrants and so on, but the point is, hopefully, taken. It is not 
difficult to see that a range of habits learned in the family have enormous 
influence on the ideas we eventually come to hold about whether we enter the 
labour market or not, which segment of the labour market we enter, which 
industry, occupation or even firm we consider working in, the wages, fringe 
benefits, pensions and employment conditions we consider fair, the degree of 
self-expression, creativity, self actualisation, autonomy, empowerment, or 
perhaps the degree of alienation, commodification, precariousness, 
vulnerability and insecurity we expect and so on. Clearly, the way the family 
instils these habits, and the consequences that they have for our labour 
market participation, is an extremely complicated process. But it is not as if we 
do not know how a great deal of this works: socio-economics has a great deal 
to teach us on these matters.  
 
Information, the family and self employment 
From Granovetter’s pioneering work, it is now well known, the family extends 
to kinship networks, and becomes one of the key causal mechanisms in 
gaining information about where vacancies exist, not to mention ‘inside’ 
information on the nature of potential jobs and on whether the employer is 
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Over the last couple of decades many workers have become 
‘self-employed’. In many cases, this has not involved a shift in the nature of 
the work, and often not even in the place of work: it has merely resulted in a 
shift from being an ‘employee’ earning a wage, to being some kind of sub-
contractor, earning a non-wage income. In many cases this results in a 
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serious deterioration of conditions, even in cases where the actual income is 
greater than the previous wage.   
 
The state 
I will leave a more detailed discussion of the state until step four, except to 
point out that the state engages in several activities that shape the ways in 
which potential suppliers of labour think and act in labour markets.  
 
Recruitment 
The final stage occurs when labour market participants are recruited from the 
job queue. At this point in time, several things are finally decided upon, most 
notably, pay and conditions; the employment level of the firm; the quality (e.g. 
skill, motivation) of the workforce; the nature of employment relations and the 
nature and mix of employment contracts. This is also where the 
consequences of the initial categorisation of the workforce come into effect as 
(say) whites are recruited before blacks. It is, however, absolutely crucial to 
understand that whilst these things are ‘finally decided’ upon at this stage, the 
causal chain of factors that led up to this point are a fundamental part of the 
explanation of these things. For example, the causal factors at work in the 
decision to recruit whites before blacks, or to offer better pay and conditions to 
whites than blacks, and so on, are distributed throughout the entire process 
taking place in the five steps I am sketching here. To establish causality 
requires tracing these steps to their origins.  
 
Consider the example of wages. Whilst the wage rate is ‘finally decided’ upon, 
or proximately caused, at this stage by the new employee and the 
representative of the firm, the entire causal chain of factors that led up to this 
point are a fundamental part of the determination of the wage rate. The level 
of any particular wage rate, for an individual or appropriate group, is distally 
caused by a range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and 
social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes sketched above, and 
proximately caused by a set of administrative mechanisms. Socio-economists 
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have coined the term ‘administered wages’ to reflect this last point. The 
administrative causal mechanisms I have in mind here are as follows:   
 
• Psychological contract, including notions of fairness and justice 
• Motivational philosophies, strategies and mechanisms 
• Empowerment philosophies, strategies and mechanisms 
• Job evaluation mechanisms 
• Job and competency analysis 
• Equal pay mechanisms  
• Pay audits 
• Pay structures 
o Narrow graded 
o Broad banded 
o Job family 
• Reward philosophies, strategies and mechanisms (individual and/or 
team) such as: 
o Performance related pay 
o Profit related pay 
o Competence related pay 
o Contribution related pay 
o Skill-based pay 
o Shopfloor incentive schemes 
o Non-financial rewards 
• Performance management strategies and mechanisms 
• Employee benefits – cars, expenses etc 
• Pension schemes 
• Managing the reward of special groups, such as: 
o Senior executives 
o International and expatriates 
o Sales staff 
 
Furthermore, the ‘administered wage’ might be set by the firm’s recruitment 
specialists using some of the above factors, then offered to the potential 
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recruit on a take it or leave it basis, or it might be bargained over. 
Alternatively, the wage might be set and offered to the individual on the basis 
of on-going collective bargaining; set and offered to the individual on the basis 
of collective bargaining taking place elsewhere; set and offered to the 
individual on the basis of customs and practice, with a historical legacy adding 
inertia; set and offered to the individual on the basis of legislation such as 
minimum wage or equal opportunities legislation, EU directives on working 
hours, health and safety legislation, and so on. The operation of these 
administrative causal mechanisms are well known within disciplines such as 
HRM and Employment Relations (e.g. Armstrong 2003). It might not need 
saying, but we should not forget that these administrative causal mechanisms 
also involve a range of social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and 
social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes.  
 
Housing, health and transport  
I noted in step one that the potential working population is divided into several 
categories. Here causality gets a little complicated because the categorical 
division often combines with things like housing, health and transport to have 
an impact upon labour market activity. Women, for example, tend to have less 
access to cars, and are more reliant on public transport to commute. This has 
a relatively negative influence on women’s ability to consider jobs in certain 
locations, and perhaps even to remain in them and progress through any 
career ladders there are. Similarly, social class is likely to be a key 
determinant of which neighbourhood, or which type of house we reside in. 
And this is likely to have an influence on our education, and our chances of 
being recruited by certain firms – one might live on the ‘wrong side of the 
tracks’. Class is also likely to have an impact upon things like health and 
longevity, which has implications for things like health insurance and 
pensions.  
 
Before we leave this section, consider what is for the orthodox model, a 
crucial issue: the quantity and quality of labour supplied to the firm. The 
orthodox theory of labour supply assumes the individual worker is free to 
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decide the number of hours s/he works in accordance with his/her preferences 
and subject to an income constraint – a few other variables can be ‘bolted on’. 
The overall supply of labour is assumed to be the aggregate outcome of free 
choices by individual workers who have expressed their preference for it to be 
this length. This conception simply leaves out of the picture, most of the 
important causal mechanisms involved with the determination of the quantity 
of labour supply. Agents are, manifestly, not able to substitute infinitesimal 
amounts of labour hours and leisure hours in responses to changes in the 
price of labour, or transfer payments. Indeed, recent EU legislation 
surrounding the right to request (but, not to be granted) flexible working hours 
is necessary to allow workers some, limited, choice of hours. Most decisions 
about what hours to work are, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by the 
employer, and take into account a range of causal factors that I have referred 
to generally, as having a technological, labour and management nature. 
Hours of work are better understood as ‘administered’. Even when decisions 
about what hours to work are not influenced directly by the employer they 
always involve some of the social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and 
social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes discussed here.  
 
What about quality of the labour supply? Orthodox theory deals with this 
almost exclusively via Human Capital Theory. Rather than point out the 
(many) limitations of Human Capital Theory, I will simply note that if the 
amount of human capital matters, then so too do other forms of capital such 
as: financial, social and cultural. And this introduces social, economic, cultural, 
political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions and 
processes into the model.  
 
Orthodox labour economists are, of course, aware that social, economic, 
cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions 
and processes are involved in determining the quality and quantity of labour 
supplied. But the moment these things are allowed into the model of labour 
supply, however, the model ceases to ‘work’. The idea of a simple choice 
between working an hour more or an hour less because of a change in taste, 
non-wage income, or wage rates, evaporates, as does the idea that 
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investment in more human capital leads to better jobs and higher pay. 
Uncertainty, indeterminism and unpredictability arise and the supply function 
evaporates.  
 
Let me sum up step three. For any individual to successfully negotiate the 
various stages just sketched and, thereby, to successfully supply their labour 
services, s/he must engage in, and with, a range of social, economic, cultural, 
political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions and 
processes.  
 
3.4. Step 4: The stages undertaken by a typical demander of labour 
services: second cut 
This section returns to the typical demander of labour, but in this ‘second cut’, 
more complexity is added by introducing those social, economic, cultural, 
political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions and 
processes that were abstracted from in step one. 
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External environment surrounding the firm 
Different firms are located in different environments. They operate in different 
product markets and so are influenced differently by the nature of product 
market demand (differences in the fluctuation of demand for the product, or 
the degree to which this demand is seasonal or uncertain); they operate in 
place and space, so their operations might be local, domestic or international; 
they operate with different degrees of competition; and are related to different 
financial institutions. The structures, institutions and organisations that make 
up this external environment exert a direct causal influence on the firm and, 
therefore, an indirect influence on labour markets. This is, of course, well 
known and expressed in the idea that labour is a derived demand. But the 
causal influence of the social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and 
social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes that make up this 
external environment do more than merely cause the firm to alter the quantity 
of labour it demands. Operating in a product market where demand for the 
product is erratic and unpredictable, for example, does not just cause the firm 
to alter the quantity of labour demanded. It may also cause the firm to re-
design its employment relations and make use of temporally flexible labour 
supplied by an agency. Changes in the way financial organisations operate, to 
cite another example, exert a direct causal influence on the firm and, 
therefore, an indirect influence on labour markets. Firms subject to take over 
by Private Equity Finance firms, for example, often change the nature of 
employment relations, derecognising unions and altering terms and 
conditions. In both these examples, a change in the external environment 
caused not just a quantitative, but a qualitative change in the nature of labour 
markets. 
 
Firms, the long run, preparation and information 
Private sector firms, especially Trans-National-Corporations, but not excluding 
Small to Medium Sized Enterprises are, arguably, the most powerful and 
influential organisations in society. Their primary objective is, of course, to 
generate and sustain a level of profit that allows them to remain in business - 
although they have various strategies for meeting this goal. Because the way 
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labour markets operate has a significant impact upon this objective, those who 
own and/or control firms often use their power to, along with other agencies, 
make labour markets work, and make them work in ways that suit their needs. 
 
In the long run the firm initiates a whole range of actions that, over an 
extended time period, impacts upon the technology, labour and management 
processes occurring within the firm. This action can be done directly via the 
firm operating outside its boundaries, or indirectly via intermediaries such as 
the employers’ lobby groups and national and supra-national institutions –of 
which more below. Firms undertake a variety of preparatory activities such as 
shaping and in some cases delivering education in schools, colleges and 
universities. Firms also play a role in creating recruitment and supply 
networks, employment agencies and the media responsible for advertising 
vacancies. Let us consider some examples. 
 
A firm that recruits exclusively, or predominantly, from a particular group of 
workers, partly constitutes a labour market with characteristics that reflect the 
characteristics of these groups. For example, firms that explicitly recruit 
women, a particular ethnic minority, immigrants, youth, disadvantaged youth, 
or non-union workers, partly constitute female, ethnic, migrant, youth, 
disadvantaged youth, or non-union labour markets. Firms do not always just 
respond to the local labour market supply, they are often heavily involved in 
making it. 
 
Some firms make use of employee or family friendly practices such as: flexi-
time, term-time working, voluntary part-time, job-share, compressed working 
weeks, shift swapping, self rostering, time off in lieu, sabbaticals and career 
breaks. Some firms make use of employer friendly flexible working practices 
such as: involuntary temporary working and involuntary part-time working, 
zero hours contracts, unsocial hours working such as twilight shifts, 24 hour 
rotations, Saturday and Sunday working, overtime (especially enforced and/or 
unpaid), annualised hours, stand-by and call-out arrangements, seasonal 
work and job-and-finish. Labour markets characterized by all or some of these 
practices, can be called flexible. What is important for this context, is that it is 
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the actions of firms that determine whether local labour markets are 
predominantly employee or family friendly, or employer friendly.  
 
Some firms actively encourage union recognition whilst others hire anti-union 
advisers, or use legislation to resist unionisation. Even where firms directly 
encourage union recognition, their motives are complex, and rooted in political 
and ideological strategies. Many firms realise they have little to fear from 
contemporary unions who appear to be less powerful than they were in the 
past. Firms, therefore, can recognise unions, engage with unions where it 
suits them (e.g. using collective bargaining to set pay and conditions for large 
workforces where individual bargaining would be too time consuming) and 
ignore them when it does not, whilst presenting themselves as being good 
employers who care enough about their workforce to let them have a union. 
Firms who engage with unions in these ways are, via this action, causally 
implicated in unionised labour markets where unions are ‘hollow shells’. Firms 
that encourage or discourage union recognition are, via this action, causally 
implicated in making unionised or de-unionised labour markets. 
 
The firm and the division of the workforce  
I noted above that the labour market is causally implicated in re-enforcing 
some of the divisions of the workforce, and amplifying the consequences of 
others. I also noted that activity in the labour market, typically, reinforces 
men’s and white’s relative advantages over women and blacks and so can be 
considered an indirect or distal cause of this categorical division. But we have 
to take care here not to reify ‘the labour market’. The phrase ‘activity in the 
labour market’, means that some people are actively making decisions about 
other people, and in this context, this often occurs within the firm. It is not ‘the 
firm’ that hires a person, it is a dedicated person who can be the sole owner of 
a small business, an HR manager or a recruitment specialist in an 
employment agency. Moreover, whoever the person is who is doing the 
recruiting, s/he is influenced by the rules, conventions, norms and values of 
the organisation, not to mention the influence of wider social, economic, 
cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions 
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and processes. Analysing phenomena like hiring (and the same goes for 
firing, placing, promoting and so on) demands that we delve deeply into these 
matters.  
 
The firm and the labour market: the case of education 
Businesses get involved in education to pursue several objectives. One key 
objective is for businesses to use their knowledge and experience to provide 
pupils with ‘soft skills’ like: understanding organisational culture, the roles and 
responsibilities of employers and employees, how to work in teams, how to 
communicate effectively, ways of servicing customers and how to present 
themselves, not to mention ‘skills’ such as motivation, loyalty, enthusiasm, 
commitment and a willingness to engage in life-long learning. The unstated 
objective of this kind of pro-business education is, of course, to create a 
workforce not only with pro-business ideas and attitudes, but also with suitably 
lowered horizons vis-à-vis what they can expect from labour markets. 
Prospective labour market entrants are currently being ‘ideologically groomed’ 
as it were, to accept neo-liberal economic ideas and labour market policies as 
inevitable, perhaps even natural; not questioning the idea that there are no 
longer jobs for life; recognising that they will have to spend years working on 
temporary contracts, ‘showcasing’ their skills, (whilst being grateful to 
employers for making them ‘employable’) before being considered for one of 
the few permanent jobs; believing that having a constantly revolving clutch of 
dead-end jobs is a way of exercising individual autonomy, and so on. This is 
not only preparing young people for the labour market and the world of work, it 
is creating a workforce that suits the needs of business.  
 
The firm and lobby groups 
The power and influence of businesses extends beyond their boundaries, 
because they are able to project it, and have it promoted by a range of local, 
national, supra-national and global institutions (Fleetwood 2008a). Indeed, the 
number and influence of organisations promoting business has grown 
remarkably over the last decade. See Farnsworth (2005: 66-7) for a list. There 
is also evidence of linkages between national and EU businesses and 
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Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) meeting through international 
business-coordinated meetings such as the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
These organisations represent some of the most important global businesses 
and ‘the importance of their members alone is enough to guarantee that they 
have good access to policymakers at various levels’ (Farnsworth 2005: 67). 
UK businesses, for example, have lobbied hard to ensure that the UK 
government does not capitulate to a EU agenda that they feel will restrict firms 
ability to be flexible. There is no need to presume that these lobby groups 
share an identical platform or seek the same detailed policies. All that is 
necessary is that they share a loose commitment to the following (current) 
ideas: to transform social policy so that it reduces disincentives to work; halt 
the propensity towards early retirement; reduce the burden of non-wage costs; 
promote supply-side measures such as improving education and skills 
training; provide more business-centred, demand-led, education and training; 
promote flexible working arrangements and labour markets; discourage 
interference with flexible wage rates and working hours; and reduce state 
expenditure and reduce the burden of taxation (Farnsworth 2005). The 
remarkable thing is that most of these ideas have found their way not only into 
the dominant policy discourse, but in many cases, into actual policy, strongly 
suggesting that the lobby groups sponsored by business are relatively 
successful.  
 
The state 
When the state is mentioned by orthodox labour economists, it is either to 
discuss its role as an employer, or to measure the effects of this or that state 
action on labour market outcomes, typically, wage rates, supply and demand 
of labour and speed of adjustment. The nature and detailed functioning of the 
state, however, remains unexplained: the state remains an unopened ‘black 
box’. Whilst there are several theories of the state, there is no need to 
associate with any one of them in this paper: we simply need to consider 
some of the activities that the state performs such as: maintaining the sexual 
division of labour, and existing family arrangements; legislating, regulating and 
shaping the education system and various other systems designed to 
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inculcate pro-business ideas into the workforce; influencing the ideological 
climate in which labour market activity occurs such as the industrial relations 
climate and much else besides. To push the latter point a little, which social 
scientist or economist interested in UK labour markets would, for example, 
deny the crucial role of the Thatcher government in fundamentally altering the 
balance of political power between unions and employers in the UK in the 
1980s? Yet I have never come across an analysis of this in orthodox labour 
economics theory.  
 
The general point, however, is this. If the state takes action, and that action is, 
in part, constitutive of labour markets, then a sophisticated analysis of the 
state, and its action, must be included in an analysis of labour markets. Let us 
consider three examples of this. 
 
The state and welfare policies 
One aspect of the state that orthodox labour economists do investigate is its 
involvement in making various transfer payments that impact on labour market 
outcomes. But the politics and ideology underlying these payments is virtually 
ignored. Consider for a moment, taking a slightly different approach to welfare 
to work policies. Instead of asking the usual questions (e.g. ‘is the level 
welfare payment X causing individuals to pursue rational, but damaging 
actions such as withdrawing, fully or partially, from supplying their labour?’), 
let us ask different ones. Is the real, but un-stated, purpose of welfare to work 
policies, essentially, to create a climate where the unemployed feel morally 
obliged to take the first job that comes along, even if it has appalling pay and 
conditions? Might it not be better to pursue policies that make employers feel 
morally obliged to offer better quality jobs at ‘fair’ rates of pay? (Peck and 
Theodore 2000: 123 &133). These are rhetorical questions, and I do not 
intend to answer them here. They are designed simply to demonstrate the 
possibility that the state can take all kinds of actions that are never questioned 
by orthodox labour economics because it cannot look into the political and 
ideological realm.  
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The state and the education system 
The British state, for example, has been extremely active recently in allowing 
business to influence the form and content of education. Government 
departments work closely with businesses, schools and private sector 
education providers to ensure that businesses play a role in setting the 
curriculum and designing and delivering courses. All 14-19 year olds in the 
UK, for example, can now formally study courses like Certificate in Job-
Seeking Skills, Certificate in Preparation for Employment; Certificate in Career 
Planning; Certificate in Personal, Teamwork and Community Skills; Certificate 
of Personal Effectiveness and Qualification in Skills for Employment. The 
OCR Certificate in Career Planning even has sections dedicated to 
understanding labour markets.  
 
The state and the family  
The relation between changing forms of family structures and changing 
modes of production, and hence changing forms of business structure, state 
structure and labour markets, is by no means straightforward (German 1989; 
2007; Seccombe 1993; 1995). Throughout the history of capitalism, 
businesses (and proto businesses, often acting via state agencies, have taken 
measures to influence dominant family types. This has often involved attempts 
(successful or otherwise) to regulate things like marriage, sexuality, 
conception, contraception, abortion, childbirth, childrearing and provision for 
elderly care of the working class. In these cases, businesses often 
encouraged the state to legislate in its favour. Seccombe charts the twists and 
turns of this ranging from interventions in marriage following the labour 
shortages due to the Black Death; via poor law wardens forbidding the poor to 
marry to prevent them becoming a future tax burden on the parish; to the 
factory acts of the mid-nineteenth century that changed the nature of the 
family and paved the way for the ‘family wage’ - and rightly or wrongly, the 
family wage underlies a great deal of labour market activity and policy today. 
Summing up developments from the late nineteenth century to date, German 
writes:  
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Time and again those proposing…the demands of women’s 
liberation…came up against the limits of class society. At their root 
was the clash between demands for equality, whether they were for 
free nurseries or equal pay, and the refusal of employers and 
governments to accede seriously to these demands, for fear that 
the costs would eat into their profits and make them uncompetitive 
with their rivals (German 2007: 16).  
 
Let me sum up step four. For any individual firm to successfully negotiate the 
various (long run) stages just sketched and, thereby, to successfully recruit 
the suppliers of labour services, it must engage in, and with, a range of social, 
economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena, 
actions and processes.  
 
3.5. Step 5: A trans-disciplinary (proto) model of labour markets. 
The previous four steps, each one based upon a range of valuable insights 
drawn from socio-economic literature, can now be brought together to an 
overall outline of a trans-disciplinary (proto) model of labour markets. There is 
no need to add a narrative to the diagram, as I would simply be repeating 
claims made above.  
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Conclusion 
Now that we have a trans-disciplinary (proto) model of labour markets, two 
questions arise: Where do we go from here? How might this model, or a 
developed form of it, be used? In conclusion I want to deal with these two 
questions.  
 
Where do we go from here? It seems to me that the next plausible step is to 
transform the model of labour markets outlined above from a proto model to a 
more elaborate, more detailed model.  This will require each of the four steps 
to be re-visited and, in-keeping with the technique of successive 
approximation, each of the key social, economic, cultural, political, ideological 
and social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes will need to be 
elaborated upon in far greater detail. I am currently engaged in writing a book 
that does precisely this. I envisage that a separate chapter would be needed 
for each of the primary phenomena, actions and processes, although some of 
the secondary phenomena, actions and processes could perhaps be ‘bundled’ 
together for purposes of saving space. Hence, whilst a separate chapter 
would be required, for example, on households and the state, it is possible 
that health, housing and transport might be ‘bundled’ together. At the end of 
the book, but not before, the model would have the elaboration and detail, and 
hence explanatory power, required to make it a bone fide model of labour 
markets.  
 
How might such a more developed, more detailed, trans-disciplinary model be 
used? It would provide researchers with a kind of map of the terrain, allowing 
them to see how the social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and 
social-psychological components that constitute labour markets are produced, 
reproduced and transformed, by whom and for what ends. It would not, of 
course, be necessary for a researcher to trawl through the whole model every 
time s/he wanted to deal with one particular aspect of labour markets.19 But 
having access to this trans-disciplinary model would encourage us to think 
more carefully about just which phenomena can, and cannot, be abstracted 
from in the analysis of any particular aspect of labour markets. Consider, by 
way of an example, a researcher interested in explaining gender 
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discrimination as a necessary first step to offering policies to tackle it. The 
model would assist in differentiating those social, economic, cultural, political, 
ideological and social-psychological phenomena, actions and processes that 
must be included in the analysis from those that can legitimately be abstracted 
from. This might involve the researcher looking into the ways in which women 
are encouraged, and men discouraged, from performing domestic labour, 
coupled with the reluctance of the state and business, to significantly change 
the current arrangements because at present the costs are not borne by them, 
but by women as they provide unpaid labour.  
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 The term ‘proto’ model expresses the fact that the model is at an early stage of development. 
2 Whilst I am critical of some aspects of the socio-economic approach, I essentially adopt this approach 
myself. I am, however, extremely critical of the orthodoxy. There have been many criticisms levelled by 
socio-economists of the orthodox model, too many in fact to cite. For my own critiques see Fleetwood 
1999a,  2001b, 2006, 2007. 
3 See Nurmi (2006) for an up-to-date discussion of modelling in orthodox economics. It should be noted, 
however, that he appears ignorant not only of the critiques of the approach he defends, but also of 
developments in meta-theory over the last couple of decades. 
4 Whilst Manning’s (2003) recent attempts to model imperfect, monopsonistic labour markets might be 
considered by some as a major advance (although many orthodox economists reject his approach) from 
the perspective of socio-economics, it remains firmly wedded to the orthodox tradition in terms of theory 
and meta-theory, and still gives hardly any insights into the nature and operation of institutions. The 
same goes for Garibaldi (2006).  
5 See Fleetwood (2008 b & c) and Hodgson (2006a), for elaboration of some of these terms. 
6 Saint-Paul (2000) is a good example of this. Misleadingly entitled The Political Economy of Labour 
Market Institutions, it contains virtually no insights into the nature of institutions: in fact they are not even 
defined. 
7 See Fleetwood 1999a for a critique of the economics of trade unions.  
8 See (Blanchard & Wolfers 2000; Maurin & Postel-Vinay (2005); Duque, Raos & Surinach (2006); Clar, 
Dreger & Ramos (2007); Koeniger, Leonardi & Nunziata (2007). Even work by, for example, Blau and 
Kahn (1996); Ayala, Martinez & Ruiz-Huerta (2002); Hancke & Rhodes (2005); Ebbinghaus & Kittell 
(2005) who have a far greater understanding of the way institutions operate, do not probe the way these 
institutions work, but end up playing the ‘measurement game’ with a handful of institutions.  
9 We need to tread carefully here as the term ‘New Institutionalism’ means very different things for, on 
the one hand, economists and on the other hand, those operating with a more sociological or political 
economy perspective – i.e. those whom I describe below as ‘socio-economists’.  I use the term  ‘New 
Institutionalism’ to refer only to those operating within orthodox economics. Even here matters are not 
straightforward because within economics are found (Old) Institutionalists following Veblem, and 
exemplified in the contemporary work of Hodgson (2006a & b). Old Institutionalists (whom I mention 
below) have virtually nothing in common with New Institutionalists. Indeed, I consider Old 
Institutionalism as part of the ‘socio-economic’ approach, and New Institutionalism as part of orthodox 
economics. New Institutionalists, essentially, do no more than ‘modify or broaden the mainstream 
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toolkit’ (Rogers 1994: 6). Furthermore, New Institutionalism, has nothing to do with those versions of 
Institutionalism found in sociology or political economy, such as the version advocated by the likes of 
Powell & DiMaggio (1991) or Granovetter (1992). See Nielsen (2006) for an excellent overview of the 
varied meanings of ‘institution’ in economics and wider social science. 
10 Bizzarely, in a paper that cannot by any stretch of the imagination be described as ‘realistic’ Selod & 
Zenou (2006) seem to value realisticness, mentioning it in a couple of places, and demonstrating certain 
conclusions ‘under reasonable conditions’ (1058). They are, however, quite happy to assume ‘workers 
are risk neutral, optimally decide their place of residence…consume the same amount of land’ and 
‘workers live forever, vacancies are filled according to a random Poisson process…’ and so on. It is 
difficult to interpret these as ‘reasonable conditions’ . 
11  The socio-economic approach is exemplified by the following: Amadeo & Horton (1997); Benner, 
Leete, Pastor (2007); Block (1990); Bruegel (2000); Burchell, Deakin, Michie & Rubery (2003); Boyer, 
(1999); Boyer & Smith (2001); Brown (2005); Callaghan (1997); Dugger (1981); Edwards (2005); 
Edwards & Wajcman, (2005); Fevre (1992); Figart, Mutari & Power (2002); Fine (1998);  Folbre (1994); 
Furaker (2005); Gardiner (1997); Granovetter (1992); Hillard, & McIntyre (1994); Hudson (2001); 
Korczynski, Hodson & Edwards (2006); McGovern (2007); McNulty, P. (1982); Martin (2000); Maurice & 
Sorge (2000); Michon (1992); Murphy (1993); Mutari & Figart (1997); Padavic & Reskin (2002); Piore 
(1993); Polanyi (1992); Peck (1996); Picchio (2000, 2003); Pollert (1996); Purdy (1988); Reskin & Roos 
(1990); Rubery (1997); Rees (1992); Rubery & Grimshaw (1998; 2003); Seccareccia (1991); Segal, 
(1986); Spencer (2003 & 2009); Standing (1999); Storper & Walker (1983; 1989); Thurow (1975); Villa 
(1987); Vogel (2000); Western (2005); and Wilson (2004). There are also two large collections by Berg 
& Kallenberg (2001) and Champlin & Knoedler (2004). Marsden (1999) might also be included here, 
although his commitment to deductivism and rationality marrs his many insights. Others have useful 
insights about markets in general, but not labour markets per se, such as Sayer (2005); Sayer & Walker 
(1993); Fligstein (2001), Hodgson (2006b) and the collection by Rogers-Hollingsworth (2005).      
12 See Fleetwood (2006, 2007, 2008a) for elaboration of this idea. I might add, in parentheses that I 
consider labour markets to be akin to Bourdieu’s (admittedly vague) conception of a field (Waquant 
1989 and Jenkins 1996: 78-970). The labour market is a field, consisting of all the social, cultural, 
economic, political, ideological and social-psychological phenomena and actions involved in  
coordinating the ideas and actions of those who supply and those who demand,  labour services. 
13 Some of the work that has inspired my own ideas and hinted at possible alternative models are 
Storper & Walker (1983); Tilley & Tilley (1998); and three decades of work inspired by Frank Wilkinson 
on Production Systems, and culminating in the collection by Burchell, Deakin, Michie, Rubery (2003).  
14 I use the term ‘meta-theory’ to refer to ontology, epistemology, methodology (and research 
techniques) and aetiology. To engage in meta-theorising is to engage at a different ‘level’ as it were, 
than to engage in theory.  A theory of (say) how labour markets are transformed is different to (say) the 
ontology that underpins this theory.  
15 Key works on critical realism within the economics discipline include Lawson (1997 & 2001); Lewis 
(2004); Fleetwood (1999b) and Downward (2003). Edwards (2005) has recently extended this into 
industrial relations.  
16 The term ‘causal mechanism’ is a portmanteau term for a range of causal phenomena I summarised 
above using the phrase social, economic, cultural, political, ideological and social-psychological 
phenomena, actions and processes 
17 I say ‘minimally’ because there are other criteria that need to be met for something to be said to be a 
bone fide theory, such as falsifiability, generalisability, verisimilitude and parsimony.  
18 This debate has several dimensions to it such as: whether or not men extract ‘surplus value’ from 
their female partners in much the same way as capitalists extract surplus value from their workforce;  
how unpaid domestic labour contributes to the accumulation of capital; whether women should be paid 
for housework; whether or not all men benefit from women’s exploitation, or just some men – 
i.e.capitalists etc.  On the ‘dometic labour’ debate, see: Beasley (1994); Beechey (1987); Bubeck 
(1985); Cockburn (1991); Delphy (1977); Delphy & Leonard (2001); Eisenstein (1979) Folbre (1982); 
Fox (1980); Gardiner (1980, 1997); German (1989); Hartmann (1979); Himmelweit  (1993); Himmelweit 
& Mohun (1977); Kuhn & Wolpe (1978); Mies (1988); Pilcher (2000); Quick (1992); Picchio (1992);  
Sargent, (1981); Vogel (1983, 2000); Walby (1987); Windebank (2001)   
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19 No-one would argue that we should run through the whole orthodox labour market model to deal with 
one aspect of labour markets, so in this respect, the two models are no different. 
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